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I. Introduction 
There is a lengthy history of devolution of federal policy and programs to the states 
through the use of grants-in-aid in general and block grants in particular.  In the area of 
agricultural policy, for example, programs for agricultural research and extension have, 
since their origin, been jointly funded by a system of grants from the federal government 
to the states.  In recent years, the possible consequence of a major devolution of farm 
policy and programs from the federal government to the states has received much 
attention1.   
Gunderson, et al (2004) explores the devolution of farm programs to the 
states. The authors suggest that approximately one-third of USDA spending, 
mainly associated with commodity and natural resource programs could be 
devolved to the states through the use of block grants within broad policy aims 
established by federal policy-makers. They present the case that devolution of 
commodity and natural resource programs to the states would recognize the 
differences between the states with respect to commodity production, production 
costs, income distribution, and opportunities for off-farm employment. They note 
that devolution is worth considering whenever it has the potential to make 
program delivery more cost effective and to better satisfy state citizens’ 
preferences and goals.  They also note that another potential benefit from 
devolution can arise from the large differences in costs between local areas as 
they address similar agricultural and natural resource issues. 
The U.S. specialty crop industry has, in general, expressed a desire to 
devolve specific specialty crop farm policy area and programs to the states. This 
desire was exemplified by the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 
2001 which provided states with block grants to promote specialty crops.2  The act 
provided almost $160 million to all 50 states and Puerto Rico. The funds allocated 
to the states were used to fund a variety of programs and the decision on what 
                                                 
1 There has been and continues to be a significant amount of debate about the relative merits of federal 
block grants to the states (Feingold, et al; Waller; General Accounting Office, CATO).  It is not the 
objective of this paper to engage in that debate.  Rather the intent is to provide some conceptual ideas 
concerning the agricultural policy composition, funding, and design of specialty crop block grants should 
they be included in future federal farm legislation. The history of federal grants-in-aid in general and block 
grants in particular can be found in  (Canada, 2002), and (Canada,  2003) 
2 The term “specialty crop” has been defined a number of ways in both legislation and by government 
agencies. The Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act of 2004 (PL 108-465) defines specialty crops as fresh 
and dry fruit, vegetables, tree nuts, nursery and floriculture. This is the definition that will be used in this 
paper. 
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programs to fund was left almost entirely to the individual states with the provision 
that the programs funded improve the competitiveness of U.S. specialty crops.  
    The specialty crop block grant program continued with the passage of the 
Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act (SCCA) of 2004 (PL 108-465). The SCCA 
block grants are to support programs in research, marketing, education, pest 
and disease management, production, and food safety. The initial legislation 
(HR 3242) called for an annual appropriation of $470 million in mandatory funds 
from the Commodity Credit Fund to support the block grant program.  The final 
bill authorized the program subject to annual appropriations, and limited funding 
to $44.5 million per year ($7 million was appropriated in FY 2006).    
The desire to permanently incorporate specialty crop block grants into federal 
farm legislation is receiving support from a number of specialty crop organizations, 
their membership, and other stakeholders.3  The U.S. specialty crop industry, in 
general, would like to see many of the provisions of the SCCA incorporated into 
the 2007 Farm Bill or other federal farm legislation.4
 The remainder of this paper explores some of the issues associated with 
the devolution of federal farm policy through specialty crop block grants to the 
states. The next section presents a brief history of block grants.  This provides 
the historical context for the use of block grants as a form of federal policy 
devolution and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of block grant 
programs.  
 The third section provides a discussion on some proposed goals for 
specialty crop block grants.  The proposed goals are interrelated with a 
categorization of agricultural policy areas and programs that could be included in 
specialty crop block grants.  The policy areas and programs presented are meant 
to be illustrative of those that could be included in specialty crop block grants 
rather than a definitive list and are presented to stimulate discussion of the broad 
issue relative to federal-state relations in agricultural policy.  
                                                 
3 A series of listening sessions and surveys were done in various regions of the U.S. among specialty crop 
producers and specialty crop producer organizations. There was some variance in the response but for the 
most part when asked “Is an active government role necessary to maintain or improve U.S. specialty crop 
competitiveness?” the general response was yes.  The results of the listening sessions and surveys can be 
found at www.cissc.calpoly.edu/farmbill. 
4 A recently introduced bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, HR 6193, The Equitable Agriculture 
Today for a Healthy American Act” has as one of its main objectives is the establishment of a permanent 
Specialty Crop State Block Grant Program (HR 6193 Title 1 Section 101). 
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 The forth section of the paper classifies the illustrative specialty crop 
agricultural policy areas and programs into one of three funding classifications: 
federal financed, state-federal financed and total state financed. The cost-share 
rules used to classify the specialty crop policy areas and programs are 
developed in Appendix A using a public finance model. The fifth section provides 
a discussion on specialty crop block grant design and funding. It is followed by a 
summary and conclusions section. 
 
II. Historical Overview of Block Grants 
 
The idea of devolution of federal policy and programs to the states predates 
the Constitution.  As early as 1785, Congress provided for grants of land to the 
states under the Articles of Confederation. Devolution of federal policy to the states 
can come in many forms, including grant-in-aids, loans, loan guarantees, insurance 
and technical assistance. Two types of grants-in-aid, categorical grants, and block 
grants often appear among the policy alternatives when devolution is being 
considered.5  Categorical grants have a narrow range of eligible activities permitting 
funds to be used for only specific, narrowly defined purposes such as school breakfast 
programs.  Congress can distribute categorical grants competitively or by formula and 
typically specifies the types of activities to which state or local governments can use 
the federal funds.  Block grants have a broad range of eligible activities and are 
distributed to state and local governments on a formula basis to address broad 
functional areas (Canada, 2002).  
 The first significant use of block grants as grant-in-aids was initiated under the 
administration of President Lyndon Johnson. The first block grant (health) was enacted 
in 1966.  This was followed by enactment of the Partnership for Health block grant 
program, approved in 1966, and the Safe Streets block grant program, created under the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (OCCSSA) of 1968.  Categorical grants 
dominated federal grants-in-aid during Johnson and Nixon administrations. The 
categorical grants were used to a fund a number of programs, including agricultural 
research, housing, health initiatives, and environmental programs. In an attempt to 
simplify the complexity and overlapping of the categorical grant programs, the Nixon 
                                                 
5 Categorical and block grants are conceptual classifications. It is sometimes difficult to classify a grant as 
one type or other. 
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administration proposed consolidating 129 different categorical grant programs into six 
block grants. The proposal was rejected by Congress, but by the end of the Ford 
administration and Congress had created three new large block grants. These block 
grants were the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), the Social Services 
Block Grant (SSBG), and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
program. The first two are still in operation. Funding for the third ended in 1982, but 
other job training block grants have since been enacted. 
The use of block grants as a means of consolidating categorical grants continued 
in the Reagan administration. Congress, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1981, consolidated 77 categorical grants into nine block grants accounting for 
nearly 17 percent of federal funds sent to the states.  The most recent expansion of 
block grants occurred in 1996, when the 104th Congress approved the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, the welfare reform legislation 
that replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children and related programs with the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. 
The use of block grants to devolve federal policy to the states has both its 
supporters and critics.  Supporters typically cite the following reasons for block grant 
proposals.  First, shifting from federal government management to block grants 
administered at the state or local level reduces federal responsibility for the 
establishment of priorities and oversight by giving states or localities more flexibility in 
the use of funds. 
 A second argument for block grants is that state and local decision-making 
about priorities and resource allocation is more responsive to state and local 
preferences, needs, and costs than federal government decision-making. Thus, the case 
for block grants is simply that in those areas of policy in which there is broad agreement 
about the federal government goals and objectives relative to public policy, states can 
determine the specific strategies employed to reach those goals and objectives based 
on their knowledge of state and local conditions. 
The third reason given for devolution of federal policy by block grants is that 
block grants can be used to eliminate the categorical nature of funds, making it harder 
for individual policy makers and advocates to take credit for services.   
A forth reason given in support of the use of block grants is that block grants can 
control spending.  Although some block grants proposals include new or increased 
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spending, proponents argue that over time there will be administrative and other 
program savings that offset those increases.   
Block grant critics have expressed a number of concerns relative to the merit of 
block grant programs.  Among these concerns are that the conditions placed on the 
block grants may reduce or eliminate the flexibility of the block grant or that if states are 
given flexibility they will use the flexibility to target programs that are politically popular 
rather than those programs that exhibit the highest need or social benefits relative to 
federal government policy goals and objectives. 
 Another concern is whether the states have the institutional and administrative 
capacity in place when the block grant program begins to achieve any cost savings from 
administrative efficiencies.  If such capacity is missing, however, the state costs of 
establishing such capacity may be greater than if the program had remained under 
federal control.  A final concern often mentioned is that the allocation of block grant 
funding between the states is not equitable or that federal funding of block grants 
diminishes over time, forcing the states to substitute state funding for federal funding to 
maintain programs or force the states to eliminate public policy programs previously 
funded by federal funds.6  Several of these concerns will be discussed later in the paper 
relative to specialty crop block grant design and funding allocations. 
III.   Specialty Crop Block Grant Proposed Goals and Illustrative Categorization of 
Agricultural Policies and Programs 
 
Specialty Crop Block Grant Goals  
The stated federal policy goal of the first two specialty crop block grant 
programs was to improve the competitiveness of U.S. specialty crop agriculture.  
It is argued here, however, that competitiveness goal is part of a larger policy 
objective, namely the long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry.  The 
long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry is defined to be a function of 
its economic sustainability, environmental sustainability, and social sustainability.7
                                                 
6 A study of five Reagan block grants (Peterson and Nightingale, 1995) found that four of them decreased 
in funding from 1986 – 1995, despite a 66% increase in total grants to state and local governments during 
the same time period. 
7 This goal is the one proposed in U.S. Specialty Crops: Opportunities and Challenges Report of the 
Specialty Crop Committee of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, Education and Economics 
Advisory Board April 30, 2006 
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Economic sustainability is defined as the economic return to production that would 
be required to keep productive assets (land, water, capital, labor, and 
entrepreneurship) employed in the production of specialty crops.  As such, economic 
sustainability can be viewed as a reservation rate of return that would be dependent on 
geographic location of production, specialty crop price, cost of production, and 
economic scale and size of specialty crop producers (e.g., large commercial producer 
or small part time or full time producers, etc).  A major benefit of a federal block grant 
program is to give the states some flexibility in addressing those issues.  
The economic return to specialty crop production is primarily determined by the 
production costs and demand for the specialty crop in question.8  For example, 
research programs that lead to new production technologies that increase output per 
unit of input or allow substitution of a relatively less costly factor of production for a 
more costly factor of production while at the time maintaining the same level of output 
and quality can lead to reduced cost of production.  Public policies and programs that 
encourage greater domestic consumption of specialty crops or provide support for 
developing and opening foreign markets have the potential to increase the demand for 
specialty crops. 
 Environmental sustainability is the ability to address the environmental/resource 
impacts that are either directly or indirectly related to agricultural production. Such 
impacts include the prevention of soil erosion, preservation of farmland, elimination of 
limitation of impacts of specialty crop production (chemicals, animal waste, dust, etc.) 
from specialty crop farms to air and water resources. Additional issues can include 
maintenance of open space, preservation of wildlife, humane treatment of animals, and 
the use of agricultural crops and production by-products for energy production in an 
effort to reduce the impact of agricultural wastes on environmental quality and reduce 
U.S. energy dependence on foreign nations. 
Social sustainability is the ability to address the social impacts of specialty crop 
production.   Such impacts include the adequacy of food availability and affordability, 
nutrition education and assistance, adequate economic opportunities for minority 
                                                 
8  Although specialty crop producers receive indirect government support in terms of conservation 
payments, market development and promotion subsidies, food assistance and government food purchase 
programs, input cost subsidization (e.g. credit, water), and research,  it is small relative to the budget cost of 
crop price and income support payments paid to program crops such as wheat, rice, and corn.  
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farmers, provision of minimum income levels for rural residents, and maintenance of 
viable small scale specialty crop agriculture. 
Though the long-run sustainability factors have been separated for discussion, 
there are agricultural policies and programs that can impact more than one aspect of 
sustainability.  For example, a new production technology that lowers the cost of 
production research and is more environmental friendly improves both economic and 
environmental benefits.  That is not to say that states should necessarily chose only 
agricultural policies and programs that impact more than one sustainability factor.  One 
of the basic tenets of block grants programs is to allow states flexibility in the choice of 
policy programs that best fit their particular circumstance to achieve a broadly stated 
federal goal.  Thus, it would be unlikely, given the differences in specialty crop 
production mix, location of production, markets, input costs, and state and local policy 
preferences, that each state would necessarily choose the same set of agricultural policy 
areas and programs to include in their specialty crop block grant program or where 
similar programs are selected that they would necessarily receive the same amount of 
funding.  However, states should be aware that those public policies and programs they 
choose to fund under a block grant program can impact more than one sustainability 
factor. 
Illustrative Categorization of Specialty Crop Block Grants Policies and 
Programs 
Table 1 provides an illustrative categorization of potential agricultural policies and 
program areas that could be considered for inclusion in state specialty crop block 
grants. It is loosely based on the agricultural policy areas and programs that states 
funded under the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 specialty 
crop block grants to the states program. The categorization is not meant to provide 
the definitive work in assessing those agricultural policy and program areas that could 
be included in specialty crop block grants. Rather is it an attempt to relate potential 
agricultural polices and programs to the long-run sustainability factors9.  
There are agricultural policies that were purposely left off the illustrative 
categorization.  Public policies that have as a goal redistribution of income such as 
                                                 
9 As was mentioned in footnote 1 the intent of this paper is to provide come conceptual ideas concerning 
the agricultural policy composition, funding and design of specialty crop blocks should they be 
incorporated in federal farm legislation rather than the merits of such a block grant program.  The authors 
are unaware of any empirical studies where the benefits of the specialty crop block programs developed by 
individual states under the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 specialty crop block 
grant program have been quantified.   
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food stamps (Warner 2001) or policy areas and programs where there are potential 
spillovers between the states such as interstate food safety issues or interstate 
environmental issues are best maintained at the federal level.  Similarly, traditional 
program crop income support programs and the associated program areas are not 
considered because, in general, specialty crop producers and specialty crop producer 
organizations do not appear to favor such programs.10
Table 1 illustrates three broad agricultural policy areas that could be considered 
for inclusion into a state specialty crop block grant program.  Listed under each policy 
area is a specific policy program. Each policy program is related to one or more of the 
long-run sustainability goals.  The three policy areas are discussed below. 
 
Environment Programs 
There are a number of federal environmental policy programs in agriculture.  
These programs can be broadly classified as land retirement or working land 
programs. Working land program are programs are probably best suited to address the 
wide range of environmental issues faced the specialty crop industry.11  The federal 
working land programs include the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
Ground and Surface Water Program, Klamath Basin Program, Wildlife Habitat 
Incentive Program, and Conservation Security Program. 
Environmental working land programs can assist specialty crop producers by 
providing them additional revenue for the provision of environmental goods and 
services or reducing their cost of production by providing cost-share programs to assist 
specialty crop producers in meeting specific environmental standards such as air, and 
water quality standards.  The use of working lands programs by specialty crop 
producers also demonstrates their willingness to address the public demand for 
environmental goods and services or concerns that the public may have about the 
direct or indirectly impact that specialty crop production may be having on 
                                                 
10 A general conclusion that can be drawn from the listening sessions and surveys mentioned in an early 
footnote is that specialty crop producers and specialty crop producer organization are not generally in favor 
of program crop price and income support programs.   At the same time, it should be noted that this policy 
position is not unanimous among the participants in the specialty crop industry.  The dry bean industry, for 
example, prefers a direct payment program over a block grant program if the restriction on the planting of 
fruits and vegetables is eliminated (Brown). 
11 Schweikhardt (2006) compares and contrasts land retirement programs and working land programs 
relative to the specialty crop industry.  He finds that working land environmental programs that address a 
wide range of environmental problems on land that is active in agricultural production is probably best 
suited to address the conservation needs of the specialty crop industry. 
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environmental quality. These goods and services include providing wildlife or species 
habitat, enhancing biodiversity, and preserving open space, or utilizing cover crops that 
help sequester carbon, filter water and clean the air.  Cost-sharing programs can assist 
specialty crop producers in adopting specialty crop production technologies that protect 
soils from erosion, improve soil quality, and reduce ground and surface water 
contamination.  
 
Table 1.  Illustrative Categorization of Specialty Crop Block Grant Policy Areas and Programs 
 Long-Run Sustainability Factor 
Agricultural 
Policy  
Programs Economic Environmental  Social 
Environment Working Land 
Programs 
X X  
Agro-Tourism X X X 
Crop Product 
Branding and 
Promotion 
X   
Direct Marketing  X  X 
Farm-To-School  X X X 
Organic Product 
Promotion 
X X  
State-Grown 
Promotion 
X   
Marketing  
Trade Promotion 
and Development 
X   
Agricultural 
Sustainability 
X X X 
Biofuels X X  
Crop Production 
Technologies  
X X  
Economic 
Research 
X X X 
Research and 
Extension 
Education 
Extension 
Education  
 
 
X X  
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 Table 1.  Illustrative Categorization of Specialty Crop Block Grant Policy Areas and Programs 
Cont.) 
 Long-Run Sustainability Goals 
Agricultural 
Policy 
Programs Economic Environmental Social 
Food Processing 
Value-Added 
X  X 
Food Safety X  X 
Harvest Technology X X  
Marketing  
Research 
X   
Organic Production 
Technology 
X X X 
Pest Prevention, 
Detection and 
Eradication 
X X  
Research and 
Extension  
Education 
Waste Management X X  
 
  Each program has some form of state administrative involvement in determining 
which projects receive funding. Each of the working lands programs has the potential 
to contribute to the specialty crop industry’s economic and environmental sustainability 
goals.  Specialty crop industry concerns center around level of appropriated funding for 
these programs and to some extent the program emphasis. The likelihood of these 
programs being devolved to the states is unknown. However, partial devolution through 
specialty crop block grants would allow the states greater flexibility in addressing 
specific state and local specialty crop environmental issues.  The degree of devolution 
is most likely dependent on the whether state flexibility in addressing the specific 
environmental issues embodied in the various working land programs can be done 
more effectively at the state level and would better satisfy state citizens’ 
preferences and goals.   
 
Marketing Programs 
Although there is no specific farm bill title or federal agricultural policy that  
addresses specialty crop marketing issues there are a number of marketing programs 
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that have been funded by state governments, specialty crop boards and commissions 
and, in some instances, federal funds to promote specific state specialty crops and 
value-added products.  Most of the promotion is directed at potentially increasing the 
demand for a specific state’s specialty crops.  The prevailing idea is that if a specific 
state can increase the demand for its specialty crops and value-added products, then 
that demand increase will contribute to the economic sustainability of its specialty crop 
industry.  The popularity of this type of state specialty crop promotion activity is evident 
from the fact that  slightly over 50% of the $153 million allocated to the states under  
Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 specialty crop block grant 
program was spend on marketing (National Association of State Departments of 
Agriculture). 
Three of the marketing programs listed above --  agro-tourism, farm-to-school, 
and organic marketing --  are shown to contribute to economic, environmental, and 
social sustainability. Agro-tourism provides an economic opportunity for small and 
medium sized specialty crop producers to increase their income from value-added 
activities.  It provides a recreational activity that can be used to educate the public and 
provide a platform to introduce potential consumers to the nutritional benefits of 
consuming fruits and vegetables.  This program contributes to societal sustainability by 
providing the public the opportunity to visit and view specialty crop farms to see first 
hand the contributions that specialty crop agriculture make to the environment.  
Farm-to-school programs can be viewed as a long-run investment to increasing 
demand for many specialty crop products by educating school age children and young 
adults on the taste and nutrition benefit of fresh fruit and vegetables.  To the extent this 
program can influence food tastes and preferences of school aged children and young 
adults the more likely it is that they will carry those tastes and preferences into the 
future when they are making their food purchases.  The farm-to-school program can 
also be used to illustrate the environmental goods provided by specialty crop 
production.  Additionally, the nutrition education provided to school aged children and 
young adults which could result in a healthier populace in the future and thus contribute 
to the social sustainability of the industry. 
 Organic marketing programs offers specialty crop producers the opportunity to 
develop and market products that can command a price premium in food markets.  
Organic farming systems rely on ecologically-based practices, such as cultural and 
biological pest management, and virtually exclude the use of synthetic chemicals in 
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crop production. Organic farming contributes to societal sustainability in several ways. 
It is perceived a providing safe nutritious food products and it is seen to provide a way 
to maintain economic viable small scale agriculture.   
The remainder of the marketing programs listed in Table 1, with the exception of 
direct marketing programs, contributes to the economic sustainability of specialty crop 
producers primarily through promotion and branding programs. Direct marketing can 
be can be an important source of revenue for small and medium sized specialty crop 
producers.  For example, approximately 19,000 farmers reported selling their produce 
only at farmers markets Eighty-two percent of farmers markets were self-sustaining, 
meaning market income was sufficient to pay for all costs associated with the operation 
of the market.  In addition, 58 percent of markets participated in some local, state or 
national nutrition program, and 25 percent of farmers markets aided in distributing food 
and food products to needy families (USDA, 2005). The latter two statistics illustrate 
the social sustainability characteristic of direct marketing. 
 
Research and Extension Education Programs 
 The role of public policy and public funding for agricultural research and 
extension education is receiving increasing scrutiny and review as federal and state 
governments evaluate their spending priorities relative to limited budgets and 
changing market and population dynamics.   The agricultural research and extension 
education system is being required by society and public-policy officials to address 
not only agricultural productivity and product innovation issues that affect food cost 
and market competitiveness issues but also concerns regarding nutrition and health, 
food safety and quality, convenience and variety, the environment, and societal 
issues such a worker safety, economic opportunity for small and minority producers, 
and food assistance.  A detailed review of each research and extension education 
program presented in Table 1 is beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, a more 
general discussion of the economic, environmental, and societal sustainability issues 
relative to specialty crop research and extension education programs will be 
presented. 
 A review of Table 1 indicates that all of the research and education programs 
listed contribute to at least two of the sustainability goals, and programs for 
agricultural sustainability, economic research and extension education, and organics 
contribute to all three goals. Those research and extension education programs that 
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contribute to achieving some combination of economic, environmental, and social 
sustainability goals do so by assisting the specialty crop industry in meeting 
changing consumer food demand and by improving existing or developing new crop 
production and pest detection and control technologies that maintain or improve US 
specialty crop competitiveness and provide society with environmental and social 
benefits.  
 Research and extension education programs that assist the specialty crop in 
meeting changing consumer demand can be categorized as those that provide 
support in responding to consumer demand for more varied, convenient products 
with desirable sensory attributes such as taste and appearance.  It could be argued 
that the greater burden for meeting consumer demand for varied, convenient 
products with desirable sensory attributes lies with the specialty crop industry since 
the likely benefits would be directed to specific specialty crop producers (e.g. larger 
tastier oranges, perishable vegetable with longer shelf life, etc).  However, there is a 
supportive role for research and extension education in the areas of market 
research, development of new crop cultivars and specialty crop food products to 
meet changing consumer food product tastes. For example, development of 
differentiated products that have unique design or qualitative characteristics, in 
contrast to undifferentiated crops, can often be sold at higher prices than other 
products. Production of these niche items presents a growing opportunity for small 
and medium size farmers to satisfy changing customer tastes and increase the 
profitability of their goods.  
  The second general class of crop and specialty crop product research and 
extension education programs would be those that provide a basis for responding to 
other consumer preferences that the market may undervalue such as consumer 
demand for perceived environmentally benign goods, nonsensory attributes of food 
products such as such as nutrition and safety, or attributes that meet ethical or 
religious standards.   These food attributes are more difficult for consumers to 
identify and thus not provide the market signals that would drive specialty crop 
producers toward new product development that meets those demands.  
 Economic research and extension education programs can provide economic 
information, contribute to technological change (production and management 
innovations, product introduction and marketing methods, and research and 
development management tools) and contribute to public policy (institutional 
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innovations, policy analysis tools, and policy impact assessment) that can assist  
specialty crop producers in achieving economic, environmental, and social 
sustainability. Economic research is also useful for identifying barriers and 
opportunities relative to the long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry. 
There is relative little private incentive for investment in economic research and 
extension education, thus providing a strong justification for public investment.   
 Research and extension education programs in the development and 
adoption of new or improved specialty crop production technologies that result in 
achieving higher crop production productivity, lower costs of production, and provide 
for improved pest prevention, detection, and eradication can have significant impact 
on long-run specialty crop economic sustainability.  These research and extension 
education programs can also be directed at reducing or eliminating the negative 
impact of existing specialty crop production technologies on the environment thus 
reducing social costs of production.  For example, the development of chemical 
intensive specialty crop production practices significantly increased production 
productivity.  However, this expansion had negative impacts on society by affecting 
farm worker health, water quality, and wildlife habitat. Consumers appear to have 
become increasingly concerned about these impacts in recent years. National polls 
show most consumers express some form of concern about exposure to chemical 
used in producing, storing and processing food products.  New technologies that can 
reduce these environmental impacts while addressing social concerns will assist 
specialty crop producers in moving toward the environment and social sustainability 
goals especially if they also reduce economic costs. 
  
 
IV. Funding Classifications for Illustrative Specialty Crop Policy and Programs  
  
 There are two objectives to this section of the paper.  The first is to develop a 
cost-share allocation framework for specialty crop programs based on the public finance 
allocation rules developed in Appendix A. Three cost-share allocations are presented: 
federal financing; federal-state financing, and state financing.  The second objective is to 
stimulate discussion on the appropriate federal-state funding share for each program 
listed on Table 1. The general rule followed in determining federal-state cost share 
funding type is that the greater the spillover benefit from any given program from a 
 15
specific state to other states, the greater the federal cost share should be, and the less 
the spillover benefits the less the federal cost share should be. There is naturally a 
degree of arbitrariness to the choice of cost-share allocation assigned to each specialty 
crop policy area program.  Rationales for the choices are presented, and while it is likely 
there will not be agreement on cost-share type assigned to each of the specialty crop 
policy area program, the framework can be used to stimulate deliberation about the 
appropriate cost-share allocation. That discussion will center, in part, on the magnitude 
of direct and spillover benefits of the various specially crop policy programs that have 
been presented.  
 It is argued that public finance funding rules would allow for the most 
economically efficient allocation of federal and state funds. This would appear to be in 
line with a primary rational for devolving federal government policy (and funds) to the 
states through the use of specialty crop state block grants which is to allow the states 
some latitude in achieving federal government policy goals more efficiently and 
effectively at a local level than could be achieved at a federal level. However, as noted 
in the second section of the paper, critics of block grants often argue that when states 
are given the flexibility associated with block grants they will use that flexibility to target 
programs that are politically popular rather than those that exhibit the highest need or 
social benefits relative to the stated federal policy goals and objectives.  That is political 
considerations can supersede economic efficiency considerations in the block grant 
funding allocation decisions.  
 The cost-share finance allocations are shown in Table 2.  There is no attempt to 
provide percentage allocations where federal-state funding is suggested as the 
appropriate cost-share funding type, nor will any attempt rank the various programs 
relative to spillover benefits that they may produce. That is best left to the individual 
states and federal government to determine, but that determination should be based, at 
least in part, on the extent to which the states can demonstrate that benefit spillovers 
will occur from the proposed uses of the specialty crop block grant funds.    
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Table 2.  U.S Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding  
 Funding Type 
Agricultural 
Policy  
Programs Federal 
Financed 
State-Federal 
Financed 
State Financed 
Environmental Working Land 
Programs 
 X  
Marketing  Agro-Tourism  X  
 Crop Product 
Branding and 
Promotion 
  X 
 Direct 
Marketing 
 X  
 Farm-to-School  X  
 Organics 
Product 
Promotion 
 X  
 State-Grown 
Promotion 
  X 
 Trade 
Promotion and 
Development 
  X 
Agricultural 
Policy 
Programs Federal 
Funding  
Federal-State 
Funding  
State Funding  
Research and 
Extension 
Education 
Agricultural 
Sustainability  
 X  
 Biofuels X   
 Crop 
Production 
Technologies  
X   
 Economic 
Research  
 X  
 Extension 
Education 
 X  
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Table 2.  U.S Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding (Cont.) 
 Funding Type 
Agricultural 
Policy 
Programs Federal 
Funding  
Federal-State 
Funding  
State Funding  
 Food Processing 
Value-Added 
 X  
 Food Safety  X  
 Harvest Technology X   
 Marketing  
Research 
  X 
 Organic Production 
Technology 
 X  
 Pest Prevention, 
Detection and 
Eradication  
 X  
 Waste Management   X 
 
Environmental Programs 
As was noted in section III environmental working land programs can assist 
specialty crop producers by providing them additional revenue for the provision of 
environmental goods and services or reducing their cost of production by providing 
cost-share programs to assist specialty crop producers in meeting specific 
environmental standards such as air, and water quality standards. These programs 
easily fall under the federal-state cost share funding type category since they already 
have some degree of state administrative involvement.   
The percent of federal-state cost share would depend on the amount of spillover 
benefit that occurs due to these programs.  The case can be made that to the extent 
that cleaner air and water in a state primarily benefit that state’s citizens relative to its 
spillover benefits to other states the more the state should bear the costs of those 
programs.  However, it is also a valid argument to note that the provision of open 
space, farmland preservation, and provision of wildlife habitat in a specific state can 
have spillover benefits to the rest of the states.  For example, a national goal is the 
protection of endangered species.  Thus, to the extent a state has a relatively large 
proportion of endangered species within its boundaries the more spillover benefit it is 
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providing to the rest of the nation given that its working land programs are providing 
such a protection.  
This example provides at least some framework for determining percentage 
allocations.  The more a state provides for achievement of a national goal (preservation 
of farmland, open space, wildlife habitat, etc) the greater the federal contribution should 
be in the cost-share percentage.  
 
Marketing Programs 
Marketing programs fall under two different funding types, federal-state cost share 
and state funded.  The state funded marketing program include specialty crop branding 
and promotion programs and state-grown promotion programs.  There is a relatively 
long history of state-legislated commodity marketing orders.12  In the 1980’s many 
states launched the programs to collectively promote all products produced within the 
states under a single state brand.  Examples included Jersey Fresh and Something 
Special from Wisconsin.  This was followed in the 2000’s with programs such as Buy 
California Grown and A+ Alabama.  Currently 43 states have state branding 
programs.13 The degree to which these programs have been successful is mixed.14  An  
economic argument ( Means, 1987) can be made that these types of programs have 
little likelihood of success since for the most part agricultural products are inherently 
difficult to differentiate and even where  evidence exists that crop promotion programs 
and state grown programs can result in some degree of product differentiation (Hayes, 
Lence, and Stoppa, 2003)  it is difficult to argue that specific crop promotion programs  
(e.g., Washington apples)  or state-brand programs (e.g., Buy California Grown) would 
have significant spillover benefits to other states. It is much more likely that most of the 
benefits that would accrue from engaging in these types of promotional activities would 
accrue to the given state’s specialty crop industry or to a specific specialty crop 
industry located within a state15. 
                                                 
12 Forker and Ward (1993) counted as many as 261 state legislated marketing orders in 1989.  
13 See Patterson (2006) for a tabular description of states, program name, year established, and budget. 
14 Patterson et al., (1999) showed little evidence of the Arizona Grown program increased product sales 
while Govindasamy et al. (2003) argued that the Jersey Fresh program provided $32 in return for fruit and 
vegetable growers for each dollar invested. 
15 It might be argued that specific commodity and/or state promotion programs could increase aggregate 
consumer demand for a product or set of products; however, there would appear to be a lack of empirical 
evidence to support that argument.  
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Trade promotion and development programs potentially open up new foreign 
market and/or expand existing foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products. These 
programs have the same product differentiation issues associated with them as crop 
product branding and promotion programs and state-grown promotion programs have.  
If a given state promotes its products to a specific foreign market and another state 
promotes very similar products to the same foreign market using federal funds then the 
question arises to whether there is a spillover benefit.  The lack of a spillover effect of a 
state promoting its specially crop products in competition with other states is 
complicated by federal programs that support the development and promotion of U.S. 
agricultural products and have various programs to support individual industries in the 
promotion of their specific programs to foreign markets.   
Thus it is likely that most if not the entire benefit of these types of promotional 
programs would be retained in the individual state and/or by specific industries within a 
state and unless a substantive argument can be made otherwise it would appear 
appropriate for these state specific trade promotion programs to be funded from mostly 
if not entirely by state funds. 
The reminder of the marketing programs would seem to qualify for some type of 
federal-state funding match. Agro-tourism, direct marketing and organics product 
promotion programs can be useful in providing small and medium sized specialty crop 
producers will market outlets and the opportunity to increase their farm revenues.   All 
of these programs have some history of receiving federal support through a variety of 
federal programs.  The primary rationale for federal support of these programs is the 
maintenance of the small to medium sized family farms, preservation of open space, 
and long-run agricultural sustainability.  If these continue to be federal goals for the 
agricultural sector, then it would seem appropriate to provide federal funding for them 
in form of specialty crop block grants so that the states can have the flexibility to 
develop specific programs in these areas that best fit their local conditions. 
Farm-to-School programs can be used to educate children on the health benefits 
associated with the consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables.  The 2001 report The 
Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent Overweight and Obesity notes that, left 
unabated, overweight and obesity may soon cause as much preventable disease and 
death as smoking.   Further, their associated health problems have substantial 
economic consequences for the U.S. health care system. The increasing prevalence of 
overweight and obesity is associated with both direct and indirect costs.  The costs 
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associated with obesity, totaling $117 billion in 2000, are due to type 2 diabetes, 
coronary heart disease, and hypertension.  Thus federal funding of programs like the 
farm-to-school program can have substantial spillover benefits if they result in 
reductions in diet related diseases.   
 
Research and Extension Education Programs 
Federal funding of agricultural research and extension education programs has a 
long history.  In 1862, Congress passed the Morrill Land Grant College Act, which gave 
states and U.S. territories land that they could sell to develop colleges that would offer 
practical instruction in agriculture and mechanical arts.  Studies have shown that past 
public investment in agricultural research resulted in large economic benefits of 
between 30% to 60% annual rate of return.16  This high rate of return implies that 
additional dollars for agricultural research would result in substantial increases in 
economic growth.   
Government supports research and extension education programs in agriculture 
because of the” public nature” of knowledge17. The public nature of research and 
extension education programs results in benefits that cannot be captured (or captured 
to a very limited extent) by a single entity.  Those benefits that are not captured 
become spillover benefits. Examples of spillover benefits from agricultural research 
and extension education programs include states copying technological innovations 
that can reduce production costs, reduce environmental damage for specialty crop 
production, increase yields, reduce crop susceptibility to pests, improve pest 
prevention, detection and eradication technologies, adopting or improving upon new 
plant cultivars or copying value-added products that were the result of agricultural 
research in other states. Additionally, agricultural research can provide benefits to 
consumers from lower priced products, improved products, and greater consumer 
product choices and provide economic information and extension education to 
                                                 
16Alston, et al in a summary of 289 studies of the returns to agricultural research and education (extension) 
since 1958, including 164 studies during the 1990 – 1998 time period found returns to agricultural research 
to be very high.  A recent USDA study Agricultural Research and Development: Public and Private 
Investments under Alternative Markets and Institutions (1996) concluded that after adjusting for a number 
of possible errors that the rate of return was likely to around 35%. Similar studies on the extension 
education show rates of return  in the 20% range (Huffman and Everson, 1993) 
17 Knowledge has two characteristics of a public good.  The first is that the use of the knowledge does not 
reduce the amount available to others and the second is that others cannot be prevented from using the 
knowledge once it becomes available. 
 21
agricultural producers, specialty crop stakeholders, and government officials that 
allows for more informed decision-making on their part.18   
A basic question that must be addressed before discussing the funding type for 
the agricultural research programs and extension education areas in table 2 is what 
type of agricultural research should be devolved to the states and what type is best left 
to the federal government to pursue?  Research programs can be defined as basic or 
applied.  The National Science Foundation (NSF) defines basic research as research 
conducted to gain a more complete understanding of the subject under study without a 
specific application in mind.  The NSF defines applied research as research aimed at 
gaining knowledge to meet a specific and recognized need.19  It is argued here that the 
basic research is best left in the hands of universities and public research agencies 
and specific applied research programs could be devolved to the states.  
There are two rationales for this argument.  First, there is a long history of basic 
agricultural research conducted by USDA and the Land Grant universities. USDA 
conducts research at the Agricultural Research Service, Economic Research Service, 
and Forest Service and it provided extramural funding since the latter-half of the 19th 
century to the Land Grant universities to do basic research.  It is not likely that the states 
should or would want to duplicate these research efforts nor is it likely that any of the 
benefits that accrue to block grants programs could be achieved if these basic research 
programs were to be devolved to the states.  The rationale for devolving selected 
applied research programs to the states rests on one of the basic premises for 
devolution of federal policy and funding to the states that state and local decision-making 
about priorities and resource allocation is more responsive to state and local 
preferences, needs, and costs than federal decision-making. Thus, the case for 
devolution of selected applied research programs to the states via specialty crop block 
grants is that the states based on their knowledge of state and local conditions should be 
                                                 
18 Although not discussed here two important questions need to be answered in determining the value of 
public financed research and extension education:  First, what is the likelihood of success of any given 
research or extension education project?  Second, is the research or extension education project is 
successful, what is its value to society? 
19 Basic research would include research in the general sciences (e.g. genetics, biology, zoology) and pre-
technical sciences (e.g. soil chemistry, plant physiology, nutrition, applied economics).  Applied research 
concentrates on technology invention such as plant and animal breeding, horticulture, irrigation methods, 
and farm management among others.  It should be noted that NSF characterization of basic and applied 
research is not universally accepted since what may be basic research to one researcher may be applied 
research to another. 
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in a better position than the federal government to determine what selected applied 
research best fits their needs. 
All of the agricultural research program areas and extension education shown in 
Table 2 have the potential to provided spillover benefits from one state to the others.  
Three of the research and extension education program areas are indicated as federal 
funding type programs.  Each of these areas can have major spillover benefits 
associated with each and each supports federal policy goals.  Biofuels have the 
potential to be an important source of renewable energy, thus permitting the U.S. to 
reduce its reliance on foreign energy resources which is a stated national goal.  State 
research in this area that leads to greater utilization of specialty crop biofuels 
(production residues, cannery wastes, etc) can easily be adopted by other states. 
Research that results in improved specialty crop production technologies such as 
higher productivity, more sustainable specialty crop production practices, and 
increasing the number of disease resistant specialty crop cultivars to name can have 
significant spillover benefits.   
Improvements in specialty crop harvest technologies might include labor-saving 
technologies, increased food safety, and more environmentally benign harvest 
technologies. There are spillover benefits between the various specialty crop states as 
improvements in specialty crop harvest technologies are made.  The benefits could 
include less reliance on foreign workers for harvest, lower harvest costs, increased 
food safety, and less environment degradation.  Each of these benefits assists the 
federal government in achieving some national policy objective: immigration reform, 
greater economic sustainability for the U.S. specialty crop industry, a safer food supply, 
and a cleaner environment.    
Seven research and extension education programs are designated as federal-
state funding types: agricultural sustainability, economic research, extension education, 
food processing value-added, food safety, organic production technology, and pest 
prevention, detection, and eradication.  As was mentioned earlier no attempt is made 
to provide a numerical percentage of federal versus state funding for those programs 
where joint funding is the designated funding type. This is especially true for these 
seven programs. Although, a case can be made that spillover benefits will occur from 
the research and extension education programs in these seven program areas, it is 
less clear what percent of the research and extension education benefits would accrue 
directly to a specific state and what percentage would spillover between states.  The 
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federal-state funding allocation will most likely have to be determined on a state by 
state program by program negotiation between the states and the federal government. 
Two research areas are designated a state funding types.  The benefits from 
marketing research studies and waste management projects are most likely to accrue 
mostly, if not entirely, to a specific state or specific specialty crop industry within a 
state. As was noted earlier unless a substantive argument can be made otherwise it 
would appear that funding for these types of programs come from state funds. 
This section has provided an illustrative funding classification for each of the 
program areas listed in Table 2.  The program areas are classified by funding type, i.e., 
federal funding, joint funding by the federal and state governments, or state funding.  It 
should be emphasized that the funding type selected for each program area is based 
on the public finance funding allocation rules developed in Section III.  The basic 
decision rule used was the degree to which benefits from these programs was thought 
spillover from state to the next.  This suggests that a degree of arbitrariness is 
imbedded in the how the funding allocations were determined; however, the intent of 
this section was not to provide a definitive set of funding type allocations. Rather, the 
intent was to provide a funding type allocation framework and to stimulate discussion 
on what the appropriate federal-state funding share should be given if specialty crop 
block grants become a permanent component of federal farm legislation. 
 
V. Block Grant Design Concepts and Funding issues 
 
 Earlier in the paper, a number of concerns relative to block grants were 
presented. These concerns include: (1) states using block grant funds to fund programs 
that are politically popular rather than  those that exhibit the highest needs or benefits 
relative to the stated federal goals and objectives; (2) that the conditions placed on the 
block grants may reduce or eliminate the flexibility of the block grant; (3) that all states 
may not have the institutional or administrative support to manage a block grant 
program; and (4) the issue of determining the allocation of funding between the federal 
government and states and the maintenance of federal funding of specialty crop block 
grants over time. 
Canada (2001) provides concepts for legislative design and oversight relative to 
federal grants to the states. Several of the concepts identified are relevant to the 
design of a specialty crop block grant program.  The relevant concepts include 
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conditioning of grants, matching requirements; formulas for allocating funds, 
intergovernmental review, and congressional oversight.  The matching requirement 
concept is addressed in the Funding Classification for Illustrative Specialty Crop Policy 
and Programs section of the paper.  The discussion below will concentrate on 
conditioning of grants and formula allocation of specialty crop block grant funding since 
these are the concepts that best address the concerns described in the second section 
of the paper. 
The conditioning of federal funds can be used to address points 1 and 2 above. 
The term “conditioning” refers to requirements the federal government places on 
recipients of grant funds.  Two types of conditioning are discussed by Canada -- 
general requirements and crossover sanctions.  General requirements apply to almost 
every federal assistance program and focus on the manner in which recipients use 
federal funds.  They address such issues as financial accountability, non-
discrimination, and environmental protection.  Crossover sanctions impose financial 
sanctions in one functional area to influence state policy in another area.  An example 
of a crossover sanction would be the withdrawal of federal highway funds if a state 
does not meet certain air quality standards.  
 The use of conditioning mechanisms to address points 1 and 2 for specialty crop 
block grants would require the federal government to designate the goals and 
objectives for the grant program, while providing states the flexibility to choose specific 
policy programs that best fit their particular circumstance to achieve the federal goals 
and objectives.  Thus, if the conditioning is designed properly, it could reduce the 
public and political pressure on the state agency administering the specialty crop block 
grant to develop state programs that may be political popular but do not exhibit the 
highest needs or benefits relative to the federal goals and objectives.  At the same 
time, proper design can still provide the states with the flexibility associated with a 
block grant program. 
Concerns have been expressed that some states may not have the have the 
institutional or administrative support and/or manage a specialty crop block grant 
program.20  These concerns range from states being unable to identify block grant 
                                                 
20 It has been pointed out by critics of specialty crop block grants that some states were not as effective as 
others in administering projects that had identifiable benefits in the specialty crop block grant program that 
was authorized in the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 (House Committee on 
Agriculture, Subcommittee on Livestock and Horticulture Hearing, November 5, 2003, Serial No. 108-20, 
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benefits to the duplication or overlap between state and federal programs, to the 
overlap between state programs, to the costs of administering block grant programs.  
These concerns could be addressed by conditioning mechanisms and by the states 
providing evidence that they do have the institutional and administrative capabilities 
and capacities to manage a specialty crop block grant program.  The latter could be a 
requirement for applying for a specialty crop block grant. 
All block grant programs use formulas to determine the grant amounts available to 
recipients.  Congress determines the formulas or the formula variables that are used to 
distribute the funds.  The selection of the formula or formula variables can spark much 
debate in Congress and among recipients.  There are a number of allocation principles 
that can be adopted by Congress.  These include Fair Share, Need for Services, Fiscal 
Equalization, Actual Amount of Costs, and Targeting. 
  Fair Share allocations can be allocations based on some proportion of an 
economic measure or physical measure such as farm proceeds or acreage.  Need for 
Services bases the allocation on need. The need is typically based on some sub-group 
of the target population such as small producers or organic producers. Fiscal 
Equalization allocations are based on the differing ability of state (or localities) 
governments to finance policy programs thus those deemed less fiscally able would 
receive higher allocations.  Actual Amount of Costs allocations are based on the fact 
that some states (or localities) face higher costs than other states in providing 
comparable public services thus requiring more federal assistance. Targeting 
allocations concentrates funding to a select group of recipients such as those in some 
geographical regions such as drought regions of the U.S.  A case could be made that 
any of these allocation methods could be used to allocate specialty crop block grant 
funds among the states.  The allocation examples presented here are based on the 
Fair Share principle.  It was chosen since this was the allocation principle in allocating 
funds to the states in the specialty crop block grant program that was authorized in the 
Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001. 
Two types of Fair Share allocations are shown as examples.  Table 3 shows the 
allocations that would occur if straight percentage of state farm receipts were used as 
the basis for the specialty crop funding allocations.  Farm receipts are based on five 
different definitions of specialty crops. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Review of Domestic Policies Affecting the Specialty Crop Industry.  Available at 
[http://gpo.gov/congress/house] 
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 Straight Percentage  Average Farm Receipts 2003 - 2005
$1.00
Fruit, Nuts, 
Vegetables & 
Greenhouse/ 
Nursery
All Specialty 
Crops
Fruits, Nuts, 
Vegetables, 
Greenhouse/ 
Nursery & 
Aquaculture
Fruits, Nuts, 
Vegetables, 
Greenhouse/ 
Nursery & 
Livestock and 
Products
All Specialty 
Crops & 
Livestock 
and Products
California $0.41 $0.37 $0.40 $0.17 $0.17
Colorado $0.01 $0.02 $0.01 $0.03 $0.03
Florida $0.10 $0.09 $0.10 $0.04 $0.04
Iowa $0.00 $0.01 $0.00 $0.04 $0.04
Michigan $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.02 $0.02
Nebraska $0.00 $0.01 $0.00 $0.04 $0.04
New York $0.02 $0.02 $0.02 $0.02 $0.02
Texas $0.04 $0.05 $0.04 $0.08 $0.08
Washington $0.06 $0.07 $0.06 $0.03 $0.03
Table 3. Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding 
 
 
 Table 3 shows the allocation that would exist for every $1.00 of specialty crop 
block grant funding for nine states.  The nine states were chosen to show the allocation 
outcomes based on different specialty crop definitions.  California would receive $0.41 
of every dollar allocated to specialty crop block grants if the specialty crop definition is 
defined to include fruits, nuts, vegetables, and greenhouse/nursery products. 
California’s allocation would decrease to $0.17 of every dollar, however, under the 
most inclusive definition of all specialty crop (fruits, nuts, vegetables, 
greenhouse/nursery, non-program grains, hay, other non-program crops, and livestock 
and products.  In contrast, Iowa’s specialty block grant allocation would increase from 
almost zero ($0.005 per $1.00) to $0.04 per $1.00 as the definition becomes more 
inclusive. 
Table 4 shows the allocations that would exist for the same states and same 
specialty crop definitions if every state received a base amount plus some percentage 
of farm receipts.  This is similar to the allocation principle adopted for the distribution of 
specialty crop block grant funds authorized under the Emergency Agricultural 
Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001. 
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Base 15% of Total Allocation
$1.00
Fruit, Nuts, 
Vegetables & 
Greenhouse/ 
Nursery
All Specialty 
Crops
Fruits, Nuts, 
Vegetables, 
Greenhouse/ 
Nursery & 
Aquaculture
Fruits, Nuts, 
Vegetables, 
Greenhouse/ 
Nursery & 
Livestock and 
Products
All Specialty 
Crops & 
Livestock 
and Products
California $0.353 $0.320 $0.347 $0.146 $0.144
Colorado $0.013 $0.016 $0.013 $0.026 $0.026
Florida $0.091 $0.079 $0.090 $0.036 $0.034
Iowa $0.005 $0.008 $0.005 $0.040 $0.039
Michigan $0.026 $0.027 $0.025 $0.018 $0.019
Nebraska $0.005 $0.008 $0.005 $0.041 $0.040
New York $0.021 $0.020 $0.021 $0.019 $0.019
Texas $0.037 $0.042 $0.037 $0.067 $0.067
Washington $0.054 $0.059 $0.053 $0.026 $0.029
Table 4. Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding Base Plus Percentage Average Farm Receipts 2003- 2005
 
 
Table 4 shows the specialty crop funding allocations that would occur if Congress 
divided 15% of the specialty crop block grant funding equally across the states and 
Puerto Rico. Each state would receive approximately $0.0029 of each dollar allocated 
and Puerto Rico would receive $0.0058 of each dollar allocated.21  The remaining funds 
are allocated based on the percent of average farm receipts of the individual states.  The 
allocation is table 4 show that with a base plus percentage allocation the amount funded 
to each of the predominantly specialty crop states is less than that under a straight 
percentage allocation, while those states that are predominantly program grain and live 
stock product states tend to receive larger allocations across all specialty crop 
definitions.   
 The two examples provided give an indication of the sensitivity of funding 
allocations based on (a) the formula and (b) the definition of specialty crops upon which 
the allocation is based.  The choice of formula and of specialty crop definition will be a 
political decision, but the formula and crop definition chosen should reflect the goals and 
objectives of a specialty crop block grant program. 
                                                 
21  The $0.0029 is obtained by dividing the $0.15 by 52.  The specialty crop block grants authorized under 
the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 allocated $500,000 to each state as a base and 
allocated $1,000,000 to Puerto Rico but Puerto Rico did not receive a percentage share of the remaining 
funds that were allocated to the states thus the percentage allocation are based on the 50 state farm receipts 
as a percentage of U.S. farm receipts for each of the five specialty crop definitions. 
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 The other funding issue is the maintenance of federal funding for a specialty crop 
block program over time.  An essential issue is the question of whether the specialty 
crop block grant program should be supported with mandatory or discretionary funds.  
An argument in favor of mandatory funding is that the economic importance to the 
specialty crop industry to the U.S. farm sector deserves greater equity with the major 
program crops in terms of the federal government’s investment in its economic well-
being.  This fits well with the proposed goal of specialty crop block grant program, which 
is to improve the long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry.  Specialty 
crop industry organizations and representatives are generally in favor of programs that 
increase the demand and competitiveness of specialty crops in the U.S. and globally but 
do not distort domestic production of international markets.  Several of the public policy 
programs discussed in the illustrative categorization section of the paper speak to that 
proposition. 
 Current high deficit levels, however, pose a problem for increasing mandatory 
funding for agriculture without an offsetting reduction in commodity program support, or 
other federal farm program areas. It is unlikely that either program crop producers or 
other existing beneficiaries of USDA programs would willingly redirect money to a 
specialty crop block grant program.  While mandatory funding may provide greater 
security for long-term funding for specialty crop block grants than discretionary spending 
(which must be re-authorized each year), congressional appropriators have and likely 
will continue to make cuts in mandatory spending related to agriculture, suggesting that 
the stability of mandatory funding may also be less secure in the future. Nevertheless, 
the history of agricultural appropriations suggests that mandatory funding would provide 
a greater stability of long-term federal funding than discretionary funding. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
  
 There is a lengthy history of devolution of federal policy and programs to the 
states through the use of grants-in-aid in general and block grants in particular. In recent 
years, the possible consequence of a major devolution of farm policy and programs from 
the federal government to the states has received much attention.  The U.S. specialty 
crop industry has, in general, expressed a desire to devolve specific specialty crop 
farm policy area and programs to the states through the use of state block grants.  
This is due in part to the perceived success of specialty crop state block grant 
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programs that were authorized under the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act 
(EAAC) of 2001 and the Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act (SCCA) of 2004 (PL 
108-465) The desire in permanently incorporating specialty crop block grants into 
federal farm legislation is receiving support from a number of specialty crop 
organizations, their membership, and other stakeholders and has resulted in the 
introduction of HR 6193, “The Equitable Agriculture Today for a Healthy American 
Act” which would establish a  permanent specialty crop state block grant program.   
 The paper provides a brief history of the use of block grants as a 
mechanism for devolution of federal government policy and associated funding to 
the states and discussed the advantages and disadvantage of block grants.  An 
illustrative categorization of specialty crop block grant policies and programs is 
developed and each program is discussed relative its impact on achieving long-
run sustainability for the U.S. specialty crop industry. 
  A public finance model is developed from which federal-state cost-share 
allocation rules for specialty crop policy programs are derived. Three cost-share 
allocations are presented -- federal financing, federal-state financing, and state 
financing. Each specialty crop policy program is then assigned one of the three cost-
share allocations based on the general rule - the greater the spillover benefit from any 
given program from a specific state to other states the greater the federal cost share 
should be and the less the spillover benefits the less the federal cost share should be.  
There is naturally a degree of arbitrariness to the choice of cost-share type assigned to 
each specialty crop policy area program.  Rationales for the choices are presented and 
while it is likely there will not be agreement on cost-share type assigned to each of the 
specialty crop policy area program hopefully the framework will stimulate discussion 
about the appropriate cost-share allocation and that discussion will center on the 
magnitude of direct and spillover benefits of the various specially crop policy programs 
that have been presented.  
 The paper concludes with a discussion on block grant design concepts and 
funding issues.  The discussion focuses on design concepts that could be used to 
eliminate some of the concerns expressed over devolution of federal policy and funding 
through the use block grants to the states. These concerns range from state flexibility, to 
political manipulation, to continuation of funding.  Several types of federal funding of 
block grants are discussed and examples of different fair-share allocations are 
presented. 
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 It appears that use of devolution of selected specialty crop policy areas and 
programs to the states is a viable tool for giving individual states the flexibility to develop 
policies to assist their specialty crop industries in achieving long-run sustainability.  It is 
incumbent upon the states to select the appropriate policies that will return the largest 
benefits for the dollars expended.  It will require both state and federal officials to 
determine the cost-share that is appropriate for each policy area program that a state 
chooses to support with block grant funds.  Additionally, careful design and funding of 
the specialty crop block grants will be required if the concerns about block grants in 
general are to be overcome. 
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Appendix A.  Public Finance Theory and the Use of Intergovernmental Grants 
in a Federal System of Government 
 
 This section applies the principles of public finance theory to the problem of the 
allocation of agricultural funding between the federal government and the states. This 
section applies the relevant economic literature in two areas to determine the role that 
block grants could play in financing agricultural programs. First, the problem of 
financing public goods is examined, with special emphasis on the problems of 
providing public goods in a federal system of government. Second, the use of 
intergovernmental grants to finance public goods is examined. 
 As Breton (p. 177) noted, the problem of financing public goods is not simply a 
matter of whether government should provide public goods, but also which unit of 
government should do so. Economic goods, he argued, can rarely be classified into 
the polar cases of pure private or pure public goods. In particular, Breton noted that a 
problem of "imperfect mapping" may arise in which the benefits of a program do not 
correspond to the geographic boundaries of a taxing jurisdiction.  The problem of 
imperfect mapping is particularly important in a federal (i.e., multi-level system of 
government). 
 If the benefits of a good are perfectly mapped, that is, if the benefits of a good 
accrue strictly within the boundaries of the unit of government financing the good, then 
the government of that jurisdiction will provide the optimal quantity of the good to its 
citizens (assuming it has overcome the problem of ascertaining accurately the 
preferences of its citizens). On the other hand, if the benefits of the good are 
imperfectly mapped, or spill across the jurisdictional boundaries of the financing 
government, the investing government is likely to under invest in the good. As a means 
of overcoming the imperfect mapping problem, a higher level of government could 
provide a subsidy to the lower level unit of government to induce it to invest in the 
socially optimal quantity of the good (Breton, pp. 180-82). 
 Drawing on the welfare economics of Samuelson and the public finance 
economics of Breton, Oates examined the problem of underinvestment in public goods 
when benefits spill across jurisdictional boundaries. Assuming a world of two goods 
and two jurisdictions (the results can be generalized to many goods and jurisdictions), 
the optimal allocation for each community in the absence of spillovers can be defined 
as: 
 32
 (1) MRT = MRS1
(2)        MRT = MRS2, where 
      MRT = the marginal rate of transformation between goods X and Y  
       MRSi = the marginal rate of substitution of community i between good 
X (a private good consumed by the citizens of community i) 
and good Y (a public good provided by the government of 
community i), which is, as Samuelson showed earlier, the sum 
of the marginal rates of substitution of all individuals in 
community i. 
Thus, if there are no losses of benefits across jurisdictional boundaries, each 
community will invest in the level of public good Y that is optimal for its citizens. Again, 
this assumes the problem of preference revelation has been solved within each 
community (i.e., each jurisdiction has solved the problems of determining how much of 
the public good is optimal for its citizens and how the cost of the public good should be 
shared by its citizens). 
If some portion of the benefits of good Y spill across the boundaries of the 
communities, such spillovers must be taken into account when determining the socially 
optimal level of good Y. The socially optimal level of consumption now becomes: 
(3) MRT = MRS1 + a2*MRS2, 
(4) MRT = MRS2 + a1*MRS1, where: 
a1 = the increase in consumption of public good Y that occurs in 
community 1 as a result of a one unit increase in the 
consumption of Y by community 2; 
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a2 = the increase in consumption of public good y that occurs in 
community 2 as a result of a one unit increase in the 
consumption of Y by community 1, and 
0 < a1 a2, < 1. 
 
It is now possible to consider a broad range of spillover combinations and their 
implications for public investment decisions: 
 
1. If a1 = a2 = 0, no spillovers will be generated, and each community will 
provide the socially optimal quantity of Y for its citizens (i.e., the 
outcome is the same as in equations (1) and (2); 
2. If a1 = a2 = 1, the good is a pure Samuelsonian public good and must 
be provided by a higher level of government than the two community 
governments if an optimal level of investment is to be reached; 
3. If 0 < a1, a2 < 1, there will be spillovers generated between the 
communities and, in the absence of a system of compensating 
subsidies, the quantity of good Y provided by each jurisdiction will be 
less than the socially optimal quantity of Y (Oates, pp. 95-99). 
 
To summarize, underinvestment in a public good may result when some 
portion of the benefits of that good accrue to individuals other than the original 
investor (where, in this case, the investor is a unit of government). A socially optimal 
level of investment can be obtained through the use of government subsidies. In a 
federal system of government, a socially optimal level of investment in public goods 
that create benefit spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries can be achieved through 
a system of intergovernmental subsidies (e.g., from the national government to the 
states). 
Before considering the use of intergovernmental grants to correct the problem 
of underinvestment in public goods, it is necessary to examine the use of other policy 
tools to correct the problem. The first alternative is the reapportionment of jurisdictional 
boundaries. It is theoretically possible to redefine the boundaries of units of 
government in such a way that all benefit spillovers would be internalized to the 
decision process and, as a result, a socially optimal level of investment would be 
reached (Musgrave and Musgrave, pp. 597-602). Using a spatial model of public 
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goods, McMillan demonstrated that an optimal level of investment could be reached 
through the use of both grants and reapportionment of jurisdictions. Breton and Scott 
(1977) reached a similar result using a transaction cost minimization model. 
To rely solely on reapportionment, however, would require a unique set of 
boundaries for each good that creates benefit spillovers. This alternative would 
require a large number of unique jurisdictions to cover each good that might create 
spillovers (Break, 1980a, p. 77). More important, while the existing boundaries of 
government may pose problems of imperfect mapping, such boundaries can only be 
changed at high political cost (Schultze, p. 185). Thus, while changes in jurisdictional 
boundaries are a possible solution to the underinvestment problem, they are unlikely 
to succeed if institutional rigidities of the existing jurisdictional boundaries prove 
impossible to overcome. 
A second possible solution to the underinvestment problem would be the 
granting of taxing authority to the investing jurisdiction, thereby permitting it to tax the 
recipients of benefit spillovers. Such taxes may either be levied directly on outside 
citizens by the investing jurisdiction, or the investing jurisdiction may impose taxes on 
the activities of its own firms and citizens which, when the burden is shifted to 
outside citizens, compensate the jurisdiction for the spillover benefits it has created 
(Musgrave, p.115; Ellickson). 
As with reapportionment, however, this option may create a large number of 
taxing authorities and raise the transaction costs of collecting the appropriate taxes. 
The establishment of taxes, the share of whose burden on outside citizens equals the 
share of benefits that spill across jurisdictional boundaries, may be an equally difficult 
and costly task. If this cannot be performed at the lower level of government, a 
central taxing authority may better serve to correct the underinvestment problem. 
Finally, as Stigler (p. 214) observed, a central taxing authority may be necessary 
when the taxed parties can escape their tax obligation by migrating beyond the 
boundaries of lower level governments. 
A final option would simply be the negotiation of appropriate subsidies between 
units of government that create and receive benefit spillovers (Coase, pp. 28-42). 
While such an approach may succeed when the number of units is small, it becomes 
increasingly difficult as the number of units involved in the negotiation process 
increases, and thus the transaction costs associated with such negotiations rise 
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(Oates, p. 68; Wellisz, p. 361; Regan, p. 436-37; Stigler, 1966, pp. 113-14; Mishan, p. 
31; Baumol, 1972, p. 308; Ellickson, pp.97-100). It must also be noted that Pigou 
(1946, pp. 183-84) recognized the self-correcting nature of the small-numbers case 
and only advocated intervention in those cases where the large number of parties 
involved makes it "technically difficult to exact payment. 
If none of the options discussed above will succeed in promoting a socially 
optimal level of investment in public goods, the use of intergovernmental grants may 
be the most feasible option to achieve an optimal level of investment in the spillover-
generating good. The problem remains, however, to design a system of grants that will 
encourage an optimal level of investment in the spillover-generating good. 
Returning to Oates’ more general solution, a set of subsidies that encourage 
an optimal level of investment in the spillover-generating good can be designed 
(Oates, pp. 99-104). The optimal conditions for each community were established 
earlier as: 
 
 (3)            MRT = MRS1 + a2*MRS2, 
            (4)       MRT = MRS2 + a1 *MRS1. 
             
If a1 and a2 are both non-zero (i.e., there are reciprocal spillovers), then both 
governments will receive a subsidy. To find the optimal subsidy for each, a system of 
equations must be solved: 
 
           (5)             MRT = MRS1 + a2 *MRS2
(6)             MRT = a1 *MRS1 + MRS2,  
(7)             MRS1 = MRT – S1
(8)             MRS2 = MRT – S2
MRT = the marginal rate of transformation between private good X and a 
spillover-generating public good Y; 
MRSi = the marginal rate of substitution between good X and good Y for 
jurisdiction i, i = 1, 2 
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a1 = the increase in the consumption of good Y that occurs in jurisdiction 
1 as a result of the consumption of an additional unit of good 
Y by jurisdiction 2 (0 < a, < 1) ; 
a2 = the increase in the consumption of good Y that occurs in jurisdiction 
2 as a result of the consumption of an additional unit of good 
Y by jurisdiction 1 (0 < a„ < 1) ; 
S1 = a2*MRS2   the unit subsidy paid to jurisdiction 1, expressed in units 
of good X. 
S2 = a1*MRS1 the unit subsidy paid to jurisdiction 2, expressed in units 
of good X. 
Equations 7 and 8 indicate that the outcome of community maximizing behavior 
will have each jurisdiction i expend their expenditures on public good Y to the point 
where the value placed on the marginal unit (MRSi) is equal to the unit price (MRT – 
Si) 
 The simultaneous solution of equations (2.5) through (2.8) provides the optimal 
subsidy for each jurisdiction: 
(9) S1 = (a2* (1 – a1)/ (1 – a1*a2)) * MRT 
(10) S2 = (a1* (1 – a2)/ (1 – a1*a2)) * MRT. 
This result suggests some important implications for designing 
intergovernmental subsidies. As shown by equation (9), given a1, a larger value for a2 
(i.e., a larger share of benefits that spill from 1 into 2) will yield a larger subsidy paid to 
jurisdiction 1. Similarly, for a given level of a2 in equation (2.10), a larger value for a1 
(i.e., a larger share of benefits that spill from 2 into 1) will yield a larger subsidy paid to 
jurisdiction 2.  Once again, these results suggest that the grantor would pay a larger 
subsidy when a larger share of the benefits spill outside the funding jurisdiction.  
Accepting that intergovernmental grants may be necessary to promote an 
optimal level of investment in public goods that create benefit spillovers, the question 
now turns to what form such grants should take. An analysis of alternative grant forms 
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is shown in Figure 1 (Scott, pp. 377-94; Wilde 1968, pp. 340-57 and 1971, pp. 143-55; 
Boadway and Wildasin pp. 518-29). 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of an Unconditional Lump-Sum Grant and a 
Conditional Matching Grant 
Source: Boadway and Wildasin, p. 520. 
 
The jurisdiction can be assumed to have an initial budget AA' that is allocated 
between the spillover-generating public good and all other goods. The community The 
jurisdiction is assumed to allocate its resources between the consumption of a public 
good Y that creates benefit spillovers in other jurisdictions and all other goods. It 
should be noted that these other goods may be private goods consumed by the 
citizens of the jurisdiction or public goods that create no benefits outside the funding 
jurisdiction (Waldauer). 
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Indifference curve I1 indicates that community welfare is maximized at point E1 
and the optimal quantities purchased will be Y1 and X2. Assuming that another unit of 
government (either another unit of government at the same level acting directly--as 
among two states--or a higher level of government acting on behalf of other lower level 
governments--as between the federal government and a state government) provides a 
subsidy to the community to compensate it for the benefits that spill across its 
boundaries, what form should such a subsidy take? 
It may take the form of an unconditional, lump-sum grant. Such a grant has no 
restrictions on its use and may be allocated by the recipient for any purpose. Thus, 
some of the grant may be allocated to the spill over-generating public good, and some 
of it may be allocated to private goods (via a reduction in taxes in the recipient 
community) or to public goods that do not create spillovers. Such a grant is shown in 
Figure 1 as a shift in the recipient's budget line from AA' to BB'. The recipient's new 
allocation, located at point E3 tangent to the community indifference curve I3 will be Y2 
of the spillover-generating good and X3 of all other goods. 
As an alternative to a lump-sum grant, the grant may take the form of a 
conditional matching grant. In this case, the grant will only be received if the recipient 
satisfies two conditions. First, the recipient must use the grant for production of the 
spillover-generating good. Second, the recipient must match the grant at a specified 
rate with its own funds. 
Assuming the original slope of the budget line is h and that the matching rate 
implies that s is the share of the cost of good Y paid by the grantor, the new budget 
line will have a slope of h*(1 - s) and will rotate from AA' to AB'. The new allocation of 
the recipient will be X2 and Y2.  If Y2 is the socially optimal level of the public good, 
Figure 1 demonstrates that it can be achieved at least cost to the grantor by use of a 
conditional matching grant. As shown in Figure 1, the grantor's cost of achieving output 
Y2 is DE3 if a lump-sum grant is used, but only DE2 if a matching grant is used. This 
result arises because the lump-sum grant produces only an income effect, while the 
matching grant reduces the recipient's price of the spillover-generating good, thereby 
combining the income effect with a price effect to provide a more powerful incentive for 
the recipient to increase its spending on the spillover-generating good. A number of 
studies of intergovernmental grant programs have confirmed that recipient jurisdictions 
do respond to such price effects and, as a result, the recipient's spending on the 
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spillover-generating good is stimulated more by a matching grant than by a lump-sum 
grant of equal size (Gramlich, pp. 222-35). 
In comparing the cost efficiency of these two types of grants, it should be 
reiterated that the choice of grant form is determined by the objective of the grant 
program. This choice of objectives has important distributional consequences for both 
the grantor and the recipient. While it is true that the recipient would prefer the lump-
sum grant (since it would be on the preferred indifference curve I3), it must be 
emphasized that the purpose of the grant is not the maximization of the recipient's 
welfare. Instead, it is assumed in this analysis that the purpose of the grant is only to 
compensate the recipient for spillovers and induce the socially optimal level of 
investment in the public good at the minimum cost to the grantor. This objective can be 
accomplished at least cost with a matching grant. 
If a conditional matching grant is to be used to finance a spillover-generating 
good, the problem of financing such a good now becomes the determination of the 
appropriate subsidy to be paid by the higher level government to the recipient 
government (i.e., the determination of the s in the h*[1 - s] budget line slope in Figure 
1). A model of intergovernmental grants developed by Harford (pp. 99-103) provides a 
subsidy from each of two higher levels of government (state and national) to a local 
government that optimizes the quantity of the spillover-generating public good provided 
by the local government. Although this model introduces the additional complication of 
two higher levels of government rather than one, it permits some conclusions to be 
drawn about the optimal shares of the cost of the spillover-generating good that should 
be paid by the higher levels of government. These shares can then be translated into 
the optimal matching rates that can be used to finance the spillover-generating good 
through a conditional matching grant. For a joint state-federal program, the Harford 
model consists of two equations: 
 
 (11)  N1 = a1*B(Y) - (1 - s1) *C(Y) 
 
                     (12) N2 = B (Y) - C (Y), where: 
N1 = The state net benefit equation; 
N2 = The national net benefit equation; 
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a1 = The share of the benefits of public good Y retained by the state 
jurisdiction; 
S1 = The share of the cost of public good Y paid by 
the national government; 
B(Y) = The benefit function for public good Y; 
C(Y) = The cost function for public good Y; 
0 < a1 < 1; and 
0 < s1 < 1. 
The necessary conditions for achieving a socially optimal level of investment in 
Y are reached by equalizing the marginal cost and marginal benefit that accrues 
within each level of government. Differentiating equations (11) and (12) and setting 
them equal to zero yields the optimal conditions for each level of government: 
(13)  a1*dB/dY =(1 – s1) *dC/dY 
(14)   dB/dY = dC/dY, where: 
dB/dY = The marginal benefit of public good Y; 
dC/dY = The marginal cost of public good Y. 
Solving equations (15) and (16) simultaneously yields the optimal share of the 
cost of good Y paid by the national government: 
(15) s1 = 1 – a1. 
The results correspond to those discussed in earlier literature (e.g., Oates). 
Namely, Equation (17) shows that the federal government will compensate the state 
government for the share of the total benefits that spill across state boundaries. 
This cost share can now be converted a matching rates that, if used to 
establish an open-ended conditional matching grant, will yield an optimal level of state 
investment in the spillover-generating good. The matching rate can be calculated as: 
(16) m1 = (1 – s1)/s1
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Thus, if the federal government grants m1 dollars to the state government for 
each dollar the state government invests in the spillover-generating good, a socially 
optimal level of the good will be provided by the state government. Before examining 
the range of agricultural programs which might be financed through a system of 
intergovernmental grants, a summary of this section is in order. The provision of 
public goods is an especially difficult problem when decisions are made within a 
federal (i.e., multi-level) system of government. When a publicly-provided good yields 
benefits to residents outside the funding jurisdiction, the jurisdiction providing the 
good will not have an incentive to provide a socially optimal level of the good.  The 
producing jurisdiction can be given an incentive to provide the socially optimal 
quantity of the good by providing it a subsidy equal to the difference between the 
marginal social benefit obtained from the good (including that portion which accrues 
to outside residents) and the marginal benefit retained by the funding jurisdiction. 
In a federal system of government, such a subsidy is typically provided by a 
higher level government to compensate lower levels of government for the external 
benefits generated by these lower level jurisdictions. The lowest cost form of such a 
subsidy is an open-ended matching grant (i.e., a grant of m dollars from the higher 
level of government for each dollar spent by the lower level government on the 
spillover generating good). The matching rate must be established to equate the 
share of the marginal cost of the good paid by the higher level of government with 
the share of the marginal benefits of the good that accrue to persons outside the 
lower level of government. If benefit spillovers are pervasive in agricultural programs, 
matching grants are clearly an appropriate means through which to finance 
agricultural programs in the United States.   
With this result in mind, equation (19) can shed some light on the matching rate 
at which the federal government should finance programs at the state level.  For the 
share of benefits retained by the state (s1) in equation (19), the national matching rate 
would be: 
1. In those cases where the entire benefit of program is retained 
within the state (s1 = 1), the federal matching rate on state 
spending would equal 0 (i.e., the federal government would not 
match state spending). 
2. In those cases the entire benefit of the program spills outside the 
state (s1 = 0), the federal government will finance the entire cost 
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of the program (i.e., the program would operate at the federal 
level). 
3. In those cases where a portion of the benefits of the program spill 
outside the state (0 < s1 < 1), the federal government will match 
state spending at a level where the matching rate reflects the 
spillover rate of the program.  
Thus, the application of these public finance models to the problem of financing 
agricultural programs can provide some guidance in considering the policy alternatives 
in the devolution of agricultural programs from the federal government states.  As 
discussed in detail in the next section, the type of agricultural program in question may 
determine the expected spillovers from such programs and, therefore, the funding 
mechanism that would be best suited for financing such programs. 
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